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In principle, default inheritance has always been the underlying logic of grammar, and
of morphology in particular. Without inheritance there can be no generalisation; and
without default inheritance, there can be no exceptions. Arguably, the study of
morphology is the intellectual endeavour where this logic has been tried and tested
most successfully in dealing with a miriad of detail which is hard to match in any
other intellectual endeavour. Not surprisingly, some version of default inheritance
(aka normal inheritance) has been widely used not only in constraint-based theories of
grammar, but also in AI more generally, where it has been used in modeling human
inference.
The basic idea behind default inheritance is very simple and obvious: more
specific patterns override or block more general ones; or where there is a conflict
between a rule and an exception, the exception always wins. However, this simple
principle raises such profound challenges for any formalised theory that some people
reject the whole idea. Indeed, default inheritance challenges elementary traditional
logic in just the same way that the modern view of categories as prototypes challenges
the classical view of categories as fixed classes defined by necessary and sufficient
conditions. (So far as I know, I’m the only person to point out the link between
prototypes and default inheritance; but any theory of categorisation that allows default
inheritance automatically allows categories to generate ‘prototype effects’.) In short,
integrating default inheritance into any theoretical package is not a trivial task.
The potential problems with default inheritance are as follows:
• generality: how does the logic generalise beyond the domain of (say)
morphology?
• reliability: how can any inference be considered reliable in a non-monotonic
logic?
• certainty: how can we recognise which inheritable properties clash, and which
of them should take priority?
• economy: how can we prevent inherited properties from being stored, thereby
losing the benefits of generalisation?
• relevance: how can we prevent irrelevant properties from being inherited?
Any theory that incorporates default inheritance must confront these questions, and
the more explicitly formalised the theory, the more urgent they become. The
discussion will present the solutions offered by Word Grammar, and will explain how
these solutions are related to the other components of Word Grammar theory. It will
not try to explore how, or whether, the Word-Grammar solutions can be applied to
other theoretical packages.

The WG theory of morphology (and other things)
First, though, I will outline the theory of morphology contained in Word Grammar
(WG). Like all the other theories represented in this workshop, and in Stump’s
terminology, WG probably qualifies as an ‘inferential-realizational’ theory in the
European Word-and-Paradigm tradition, with ‘realization’ linking lexical and
syntactic categories to the forms of the words concerned. For example, the word
defined by combining the lexical item DOG with the inflectional category ‘plural’
(DOG, plural) is realized by the form dogs. Moreover, generalisations apply by

default inheritance (rather than by unification). However, WG morphology also has
some distinctive characteristics:
• Syntactic categories and lexical items are word-classes in a taxonomy rather
than features consisting of an attribute and its value; e.g. ‘plural’ and DOG are
both word-classes, with the same theoretical status. Features are allowed in
WG, but are only used for expressing agreement.
• Morphology is recognised as a distinct level between syntax and phonology;
e.g. {dog} and {s} are classified as root and suffix, and the {s} of dogs is the
same morph as the one in barks, and is a different concept from the phoneme
/s/.
• Inflectional and derivational morphology share the same realisational
apparatus, as do clitics, and differ only in whether the ‘output’ is a different
lexical item.
• Words are related not only to their stem, but also to ‘derived’ versions of the
stem called ‘x-variants’ (where ‘x’ varies); e.g. {{dog}{s}} is the s-variant of
DOG, plural. In cases of syncretism, two distinct words share the same variant
of their base; e.g. the past participle and passive participle in English are both
realized by their ‘en-variants’.
• The ‘attributes’ of other theories are expressed as network relations which are
themselves interrelated in a taxonomy; for example, the relation ‘en-variant’
‘isa’ (is a particular case of) the more general relation ‘ed-variant’, which in
turn isa realization.
These distinctive characteristics of the WG theory of morphology all derive from
one very general characteristic of WG: its cognitive orientation. WG isn’t just a
theory of morphology, or even of language; it is a theory of language located in a
general framework of ideas about cognition. According to WG, language is an
ordinary part of cognition rather than a mental module (as in Chomskyan theory). The
modularity debate is largely irrelevant for most of the other theories in the workshop,
which are cognitively agnostic, but it is crucial for WG because the goal is a model of
cognitive structure. This cognitive orientation is one of the (many) reasons for
choosing a logic based on default inheritance, given that this is so clearly the logic
that we use in everyday thinking about other things.
Morphology is a particularly good area of language to face the challenge of
describing language in domain-general terms because it is the area where language is
most remote from the rest of cognition – from both meaning and phonetics. If even
morphology can be modeled as an example of general cognition, without any special
apparatus unique to morphology, then surely language is not a special module of the
mind.

Default inheritance in morphology
As mentioned earlier, morphology is also a particularly good area for testing any
theory of default inheritance because we have so much relevant data – indeed, our
ancestors have probably been assembling such data for at least 4,000 years (since
Babylonian scribes first wrote down verb paradigms). Every generalisation applies by
inheritance, and every exception overrides the default. Moreover, the data of
morphology are (in general) both clear and highly structured. For instance, there is no
uncertainty about dogs being the plural of DOG, and it is clear that the relation of
dogs to DOG is exactly the same as that of cats to CAT. Moreover, these facts are
relatively context-independent, so morphology is a good area for building self-

contained models for an area of human knowledge, as witness the proliferation of
computer models for morphology.
Morphology faces all the general challenges for default inheritance listed
above:
• generality: how does the logic generalise beyond the domain of morphology?
If the logic is part of general cognition, it must not depend on analyses or
notations peculiar to morphosyntax (such as attribute-value matrices).
• reliability: how can any inference be considered reliable in a non-monotonic
logic? If exceptions are always possible, how can we be sure that the general
rule for some morphological class applies in any particular case?
• certainty: how can we recognise which inheritable properties clash, and which
of them should take priority? This problem becomes especially critical if
attribute-value matrices are replaced by some more general format. But in
particular,
o how are conflicts in multiple inheritance handled? In morphology,
words normally inherit different properties from a lexical item and
from various morphosyntactic categories, and normally the system is
organised to avoid conflicts, but what if they do conflict?
o if an exceptional form overrides a form defined indirectly, are the
indirect relations inherited? In morphology, the problem is common
with ‘reentrancy’ (Bouma 2006): what if the default realization of
some property p is the same as the base, but some exceptional lexeme
realises p as (say) bac – does that mean that the base also changes to
bac?
• economy: how can we prevent inherited properties from being stored, thereby
losing the benefits of generalisation? In morphology, how do we stop inherited
forms from being stored so that every form is simply retrieved rather than
created anew? (The problem is that we know from psycholinguistic
experiments that some forms are in fact created anew.)
• relevance: how can we prevent irrelevant properties from being inherited? Any
word or form has a host of properties that could be inherited, but which are
currently irrelevant – e.g. we know that a typical English word is spoken in the
UK, the USA, Australia and so on, and for some words we know their
etymology; but both of these properties are irrelevant in most contexts (though
they are both potentially crucial in certain imaginable situations). It seems
reasonable to assume that we don’t, in fact, inherit such properties, but how
does the inheritance mechanism filter them out?

The Word-Grammar solution
The WG solution to these problems rests on three assumptions fundamental to WG
theory:
1. Types and tokens are different. Every bit of ongoing experience is a ‘token’
(though this term tends to be used by linguists rather than psychologists),
which we understand by categorizing it as an example of some stored ‘type’.
And every token is represented by a separate concept (i.e. by a separate node
in the cognitive structure). In theorizing about cognitive structures we can
distinguish newly-created tokens from stored types (though learning turns
some tokens into permanent types). Rather obviously, but importantly for the
WG theory, if a token is an example of a type, then it will always be lower in

the inheritance hierarchy than that type – and, indeed, lower than any other
concept from which it might inherit.
2. Every conceptual node (i.e. every concept) has an activation level. The level
depends partly on frequency and recency of previous activation
(‘entrenchment’), but partly too on current mental activity, which is
determined by attention and the ensuing spreading activation. In general, the
currently available activation is concentrated on ‘relevant’ nodes and their
neighbours.
3. The overall conceptual structure is a ‘taxonomic network’ in which every link
is directed. Thanks to ‘isa’ links, every node (including token nodes) is part of
a taxonomy, but any node may be linked freely to any other node (in contrast
with a ‘directed acyclic graph’, in which loops are not possible). The overall
taxonomy includes relational concepts as well as entity concepts, so every
labelled link (e.g. ‘base’, ‘x-variant’) is part of a taxonomy of relations.
4. Some relational concepts are marked as mutually incompatible (e.g. ‘before’,
‘after’).
Given these assumptions, then, the WG algorithm for default inheritance (DI) is as
follows:
1. Every token inherits, but it’s only tokens that inherit; so inheritance exists just
to enrich newly created nodes. Assume a newly created token node Token,
which isa one or more type nodes, each labelled Typei.
2. Search each Typei for inheritable properties – i.e. for links from Typei to other
concepts, consisting of a relation R and an entity E. These are inheritable if
a. they are sufficiently relevant to be active (beyond a certain threshold
level).
b. the relation R does not already apply to Token, where R already
applies to Token if Token already has a link via a concept which either
isa R, or which is incompatible with R.
3. For each inheritable property, make a copy ‘Token – R’ – E’(with R’ isa R and
E’ isa E, and the same directionality as in the original). If the properties of
Typei form a loop back to Typei, make a copy of the entire loop so that each
type node only has one copy token. Notice that R’ and E’ are tokens, so DI
immediately applies to them as well, subject to available activation.
4. Repeat 2-3 for every node above each Typei in the taxonomy.
This theory solves the problems for DI as follows:
• generality: how does the logic generalise beyond the domain of morphology?
The DI algorithm is completely domain-general, and could be applied as easily
to knowledge of birds as to our knowledge of morphology.
• reliability: how can any inference be considered reliable in a non-monotonic
logic? Every inference is reliable, so the system is actually monotonic,
because DI always applies ‘bottom-up’, applying only to the most specific
possible concepts, newly-created tokens.
• certainty: how can we recognise which inheritable properties clash, and which
of them should take priority?
o how are conflicts in multiple inheritance handled? This problem is
deliberately left unsolved in WG theory, because it is unsolved in real
cognition. The ‘Nixon Diamond’ was a genuine conflict, and was only
‘solved’ by stipulating a winner. There are cases in morphology where

•

•

unresolved conflicts have no resolution and leave us without any
outcome; arguably, the gap where we expect amn’t or aren’t is an
example.
o if an exceptional form overrides a form defined indirectly, are the
indirect relations inherited? Again this conflict has no general solution
in cognition, so it needs no general solution in theory. Instead, WG
allows solutions to be stipulated by isa links between exceptional and
default values to show that indirect relations are inherited; without
such isa links, these relations are not inherited.
economy: how can we prevent inherited properties from being stored, thereby
losing the benefits of generalisation? This storage is prevented by allowing DI
only for tokens; so the inherited properties will only be stored if the token
itself is stored (i.e. remembered and learned).
relevance: how can we prevent irrelevant properties from being inherited?
Relevance controls DI through activation. E.g. if etymology happens to be the
current focus of attention, then tokens may inherit known etymologies, but not
otherwise.

